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ABSTRACT: This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization 
policies and the independence of regulators for a cross section of countries. These 
indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and 
political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications 
policies. We find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to 
which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of 
reforming countries per se. We also find that countries where the institutional 
endowment constrains less the behaviour of the executive bodies, and countries with a 
stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. 
There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a 
positive effect on network penetration when we take into account the endogeneity of 
regulatory independence. 
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RESUMEN: Este artículo presenta nuevos datos, resumidos en cuatro índices, sobre las 
políticas de liberalización e independencia de los reguladores para una sección cruzada 
de países. Estos índices se combinan con un conjunto amplio de datos de resultados, 
instituciones y variables políticas para analizar tanto los determinantes como el impacto 
de las políticas de telecomunicaciones. Hallamos que las políticas de liberalización se 
asocian negativamente con el grado en que los países se caracterizan por una tradición 
intervencionista, pero no con la ideología partidista de los gobiernos que deciden las 
reformas. También hallamos que países en los que la dotación institucional limita 
menos el comportamiento del ejecutivo, y países con una empresa establecida más 
fuerte, son más proclives a crear agencias reguladoras auténticamente independientes. 
Existe evidencia débil de que la creación de agencias independientes tiene un efecto 
positivo sobre el despliegue de redes cuando se tiene en cuenta la endogeneidad de la 
independencia regulatoria. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last years of the twentieth century were very rich in reform initiatives in the 
telecommunications sector. Many countries introduced private ownership of the 
dominant operators, liberalized at least some segments of the industry and introduced 
new regulatory authorities. Regulatory reform has, however, many dimensions and 
takes different forms across countries.  
 
The objective of this study is to measure the reform processes taking into account such 
multi-dimensionality, and to analyze both the determinants and the impact of reform 
initiatives. We focus on liberalization policies (in particular, the degree to which market 
opening or deregulation policies are asymmetric, or biased in favour of entrants) and the 
degree of independence (vis-à-vis their governments) of regulatory authorities. We 
present four new indices, two for asymmetric deregulation and two for independence. 
They summarize information on a large number of original variables relevant to these 
policy areas. 
 
Although there is a broad consensus among scholars and international institutions (such 
as the World Bank, the OECD, the International Telecommunications Union, the 
European Commission) that opening up the telecommunications sector to competition is 
both possible and beneficial for social welfare, the precise nature of this liberalization 
process is still controversial. Many of the controversial issues can be summarized in one 
question: to what extent should the liberalization policy favour entrants relative to 
incumbents? In other words, how biased or asymmetric should regulation be in the 
market-opening phase? Incumbent operators have huge incumbency advantages in most 
countries and enjoy significant scope economies, since they operate in several segments 
of the industry. However they also carry the burden of funding universal service and are 
the main providers of infrastructure. Asymmetric regulation may lead to regulators 
favouring some competitors rather than more competition, allowing the entry of 
inefficient firms and imposing unnecessary constraints on incumbents. 
 
Something similar happens with the related issue of regulatory independence . Although 
scholars and international institutions advocate the establishment of independent 
regulators, there is less debate and consensus on the particular attributes of independent 
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regulators and on how to make independence sustainable. On this, we can draw on the 
academic literature on Central Bank independence, which analyzes the problem using 
aggregate indices that take into account several dimensions of independence. We take a 
first step in this direction for telecom regulators. It is an important step in our view, 
insofar as the previous empirical literature has only measured regulator independence as 
a binary  dummy variable.  
 
We evaluate the incidence of policies (asymmetric regulation and regulatory 
independence) on telecommunications performance, measured by network penetration 
and productivity. Comparative assessment of telecommunications reform is an active 
area of research.1 Our contribution to this growing literature is threefold: 
 
First, we put our original indices to work, so that our policy variables and our estimates 
reflect (for the first time in the case of independence) the fact that both liberalization 
and regulatory independence are multi-dimensional phenomena. 
 
Second, along the lines of the recent empirical literature on political economy,2 we take 
into account the potential endogeneity of policies. 
 
Third, we use a battery of institutional indices that have not been used in a combined, 
systematic way in the rest of the literature3. Through this, we are able to assess the 
relative explanatory power of each of them, and to relate them to the policies and 
performance in telecommunications. 
 
Among our preliminary results, we find that entry policies are negatively associated 
with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the 
partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. We also find that countries where the 
institutional endowment4 constrains less the behaviour of the executive bodies are more 
prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the 
                                                 
1 See Ros (2002), Wallsten (2001), Fink et al. (2002), Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), Li et al. (2002). 
2 See Besley and Case (2000), Roller and Duso (2001), Beck et al. (2001). 
3 See LaPorta et al. (1999 and 2002), Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Henisz and Zelner (2000a and b). 
4 The institutional endowment is the set of formal or informal rules that constrain the behaviour of 
citizens in society. Examples of elements of the institutional endowment are whether the system is 
presidential or parliamentary, the degree of proportionality in the electoral rules, the quality and 
efficiency of the civil service or the judiciary, etc. (see Levy and Spiller, 1996). 
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creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration 
when we take into account the endogeneity of independence.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the specification strategy, the 
hypotheses and the relationship with the existing literature. Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 shows and discusses the results obtained with this data set, and we end up 
with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Model Specification 
 
To analyze the effect of specific telecommunication policies and regulatory institutions 
on industry performance, we use a simple reduced-form model that relates industry 
outcomes to a set of supply and demand control variables and the policy and 
institutional variables of interest (equation (i) below). This specification takes into 
account the special features of the telecommunications sector.  
 
When confronted with the decision to open the industry to competition, the entry 
barriers faced by new operators are a decisive factor that has to be taken into account. 
Policy makers may use a number of tools to favour the entrants. Hence the policy 
variable, measured with an asymmetric deregulation index, will reflect the extent to 
which telecommunications policies are biased in favour of entrants relative to 
incumbents (a larger value of the index will indicate a more asymmetric policy). The 
sign of the parameter corresponding to this policy variable is a matter of controversy. 
Some authors have criticized the policies that facilitate the entry of new firms, and 
argued that this policy hurts the performance of the industry since, by constraining the 
behaviour of the incumbents, economic efficiency is hampered due to the insufficient 
exploitation of scope economies and the reduction of the pace of innovation. An 
institutional variable will capture the effect of regulatory independence on industry 
performance. 
 
Since there may be unobserved heterogeneity in the form of policies and institutions 
being correlated with omitted variables that are also correlated with performance 
variables, we will also estimate an equation for the policy and institutional variables 
(equation (ii)). 
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The specification we use is the following: 
 
 
(i)        q = g (Demand, Costs, Market Structure, s) + ν 
 
(ii)        s = h (Political Institutions, Interest groups, q-1…) + u 
 
where q are the industry outcomes and s are the policy and institutional variables to be 
explained. h and g are functions and u and v error terms. The set of variables s includes 
both market-opening policies and the independence of regulatory institutions. In 
equation (ii) we include lagged performance variables to take into account the potential 
causal link between better industry outcomes and better future policies. 
 
In equation (i), the original policy variables are considered as potentially endogenous 
and we use instrumental variables (using the insights gained from the estimation of 
equarion (ii)) to solve the problem of the correlation of the explanatory variable with the 
error term. It has been suggested that the use of political variables (following Besley 
and Case, 2000) as instruments may help to achieve consistent estimators in the 
presence of endogeneity. Indeed, our specification boils down to tackling the 
endogeneity issue through the use of instrumental variables, such as political variables, 
both for policies (in this case, deregulation policies in telecommunications) and 
regulatory institutions (in this case, the independence of the telecom regulator).5  
 
In equation (i) it is also very important not to omit any regressor that has a simultaneous 
and independent influence in policies, regulatory institutions and outcomes (for 
example, institutional indices of political risk, expropriation risk, political constraints, 
etc.). In econometric terms, one must have a regressor that is correlated with policies, 
and use as instrumental variable the part of this variable that explains policies (and 
                                                 
5 Previous studies fail to take into account the endogeneity of policies. However, Röller and Duso (RD, 
2002) undertake an insightful exercise using political variables as instruments and find that the results of 
the previous literature on the effects of deregulation (particularly the OECD studies) are no longer valid.  
However, they treat regulatory institutions as exogenous, while, at least in telecommunications, they are 
as endogenous as liberalization policies themselves, and often decided upon at the same time. Moreover, 
among the variables that explain the policy choice they do not include interest groups, which happen to be 
an important determinant of liberalization and regulatory reform in other studies (see Henisz and Zelner, 
2000b).  
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institutions) and not directly the economic outcomes that one wants to analyze. The 
unobservable variables that may affect both policies and outcomes must be controlled 
for. This is particularly important in equation (i), since this is a reduced form equation 
that summarizes the supply and demand equations that determine the market 
equilibrium. 
 
With this specification strategy in mind, we test a number of hypotheses derived from 
the literature on political economy and regulation. 
 
Hypothesis 1) Market-opening policies are negatively associated with the 
interventionist tradition of each country, and positively related to the weight of interest 
groups and the partisan ideology of the reforming country. 
 
First, policies are typically associated with institutional traditions. Deregulation policies 
will be more ambitious in countries with a less interventionist tradition (LaPorta et al., 
1999 and 2002). Second, many policies have been observed to be partisan, i.e. different 
political parties, since they represent different constituencies, will implement different 
policies (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Right wing coalitions/governments, according 
to this, emphasizing more free markets than redistributive policies, will be more prone 
to deregulate and create an environment that is favourable to private investment in 
telecommunications. And third, policies will be influenced by interest groups, which 
compete in the political arena to obtain favourable policies (see Peltzman, 1976, and 
Grossman and Helpman, 2001) 
 
Hypothesis 2) The setting up of truly independent regulatory agencies is a policy 
decision itself, which depends on the institutional endowment of each country and the 
interest of dominant interest groups in the outcomes of this institutional setting relative 
to the alternatives. 
 
The explanatory variables for equation (i) will include a number of institutional indices. 
These political variables influence the choice of policies (market-opening policies as 
well as regulatory institutions). These institutional indices will be used also in equation 
(ii), and could in some cases also have a direct influence in market outcomes. Using this 
specification, one can test for example whether regulatory independence is necessary or 
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redundant (and hence socially too expensive) once the country has other ways to 
enforce contracts and credibly commit to stable policies. Levy and Spiller (1996) and 
Henisz and Zelner (2000b) argue that the creation of independent agencies is one among 
several options available to countries that want to commit credibly not to expropriate 
the sunk investments that characterize network industries. Whether this option will be 
exercised or not depends on the institutional endowment and the structure of interest 
groups. 
 
Hypothesis 3) Market-opening policies have a positive effect on productivity and 
independent agencies have a positive effect on investment. 
 
There is a general consensus that competition in the non-natural monopoly segments of 
telecommunications is both possible and beneficial for social welfare, especially 
through improvements in incentives and productivity. Some scholars think, however, 
that there is a thin line that should not be crossed between promoting competition and 
protecting particular competitors that may not be as efficient as the incumbent firms. In 
addition to this argument, these scholars also warn against the danger of expropriating 
the sunk investments in infrastructures of dominant operators.6 Other scholars 
emphasize the potential for strategic delegation into relatively pro-industry regulators, 
in an analogy with strategic Rogoff delegation into conservative central bankers in 
monetary policy (Levine et al., 2002). Pro-industry regulators (or regulators who have a 
duty to behave in a “pro-industry” way) would not expropriate sunk investments. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Telecommunications policy variables 
 
 
We collected data on a number of original variables reflecting telecommunications 
policies and institutions in 1998 for 37 countries. This new data set, and the way we 
summarize it through indices, is one of the main contributions of our work. The 
description and measurement technique of these original variables can be found in 
Appendix 1. We aggregated the original variables in 4 indices, two for asymmetric 
deregulation and two for independence. These aggregation techniques are summarized 
                                                 
6 See Sidak and Spulber (1997). 
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below and more detail is provided in Appendix 2. The values that the indices take for 
each country can be found in Appendix 3. The construction of the indices can be easily 
replicated. Alternatively, the original variables can be combined in different ways 
according to the purposes of other researchers. We make the data on the observations 
for the original variables available.  
 
Data have been collected from web pages, legislative texts published by the different 
regulatory authorities, documents and working papers of the OECD and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), studies carried on behalf of the 
European Commission, and articles from specialized journals.  
 
The two indices on asymmetric deregulation policies (entry and entry(pc)) aggregate  
information on the following policies: 
 
- The degree to which entry in the industry is subject to investment conditions of any 
kind. 
- The average of the number of mobile providers in 1996 and 1997. 
- The method of spectrum allocation. 
- The existence of number portability in fixed and mobile telephony. 
- The existence of carrier selection and carrier pre-selection in local, long distance and 
international telephony. 
- The rules governing mobile to mobile, and fixed to mobile, interconnection rates. 
- The availability of local loop unbundling and rules governing the access to alternative 
infrastructure. 
 
We have associated a metric to each of these variables, with the lowest value for 
policies that are less favourable to easiness of entry and a higher value to policies that 
are more favourable. These values have been aggregated into two indices, namely entry 
and entry(pc). The difference between entry and entry(pc) is that whereas the former is 
an ad hoc index that just adds up the values in all the “asymmetric deregulation” 
dimensions that have been considered, the latter is chosen among four new variables 
that summarize all the observations in these dimensions using principal components 
analysis. The new variable reflects mostly the introduction of number portability in 
fixed telephony, the absence of investment conditions for entrants, the presence of long-
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distance and international carrier pre-selection, and the introduction of local loop 
unbundling. For this reason, we think that this new variable describes well the degree to 
which regulation is asymmetrically biased in favour of entrants. 
 
Of the 37 countries for which we collected information, 33 had a separate regulatory 
agency in operation in 1998 (all except Chile, Japan, New Zealand and Israel). Of these, 
18 had set up the regulatory agency prior to 1997. In this year, as many as 11 agencies 
started operating, and four of them started in 1998. The oldest agency is the FCC of the 
US, which started operating in 1934, and the next one at the national level was not 
created until 1976 in Canada. All the others were created in the 1990s. Therefore, the 
establishment of separate regulatory agencies is a very recent phenomenon. 
 
 The two indices on regulatory independence (indep and indep(pc)) are based on 
information which covers the following issues: 
 
- The degree to which the regulatory agency is responsible for a number of policies, 
including: licensing, interconnection, tariffs, scarce resources allocation (such as 
spectrum frequencies and numeration plans), and universal service. 
- The degree to which its funding sources are independent of the government’s 
discretion. 
- The rules of appointment of the head of the agency or its board. 
- The length of the term in office for the head of the office or the members of the board. 
- The rules about obligations to report to the government, parliament or another official 
body. 
 
We have associated a metric to each of these variables, with the lowest value for 
policies that give less independence to the office and a higher value to policies that give 
more independence. These values have been aggregated in two indices, indep and 
indep(pc). The difference between indep and indep(pc) is that whereas the former is an 
ad hoc index that just adds up the values in all the “independence” dimensions that have 
been considered, the latter is chosen out of the three new variables that summarize all 
the observations in these dimensions using  principal components analysis. This new 
variable reflects mostly the regulator’s capacity of setting tariffs and interconnection 
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charges and, to a lesser extent, its independence of the government in terms of funding 
and length of term in office. 
 
3.2. Telecommunications performance variables 
 
Data on the performance of the telecommunications industry is obtained from the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) database. We focus on performance as 
measured by network penetration and productivity data. 
 
Network penetration is described as main lines per 100 inhabitants (linesinhab). We 
focus on the level of this variable in 1998 and 2001. This is the last year available. We 
also consider the rate of growth since 1998, the year for which we computed the policy 
measures. 
 
Productivity is measured as subscribers per employee and main lines per employee. For 
both we use the levels in 2000 (subworker and linesworker), the last year available, and 
the growth in the subscribers per worker variable between 1998 and 2000. When these 
variables are lagged, the data correspond to 1994. 
 
3.3. Political and institutional variables 
 
We have collected a number of political variables on the general quality of government, 
interest groups, ideology, institutions and the tradition of each country with regards to 
the state’s involvement in the economy. 
 
Our ideological variable ideology has a value of one if the largest party in the 
government was a right wing party as of January, 1st 1997, and a value of zero if the 
largest party has any other orientation. We elaborated this variable from the original 
Beck et al.’s (2001) data set.7  
                                                 
7 The original data set on ideologies by Beck et al. labels the largest party in each country’s government 
as left, center, right or non-applicable. However, the way they allocate the left or center label to different 
largest parties seemed to us somehow inaccurate. For example, they attach the label left both to the Cuban 
and to the Clinton government in the US, whereas the Prodi administration in Italy and the center-left 
ruling coalition in Chile are allocated the Center label. The way they allocate the right label seemed to us 
more clear cut. 
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We have two variables reflecting the interventionist tradition of each country, i.e., the 
degree to which the state has an inclination to intervene in economic matters. Both of 
them are collected from LaPorta’s web page at the Economics Department of Harvard 
University. One of them, legal, reports whether  the legal origin of the country belongs 
to English Civil Law or to other more interventionist traditions, such as socialist, French 
Common Law, German Common Law or Scandinavian Common Law.  LaPorta et al. 
(1999) argue that this variable proxies for the degree of interventionism of the state in 
economic matters, since English Civil Law was set up to protect the owners from the 
sovereign, whereas traditions such as the French Common Law were designed to 
reinforce the role of the state. The socialist tradition would be an extreme case of 
interventionism and the other two would be intermediate cases between English and 
French. We give a value of 0 to 4 in the order of more interventionist to less (so the 
order is socialist, French, German, Scandinavian, English). Moreover, this variable is 
interesting as a potential instrument because it is exogenous and uncorrelated with 
performance in telecommunications, since the legal origin is usually associated to 
colonization or conquest. The other measure of interventionism, procedures, is the 
number of steps that a new business has to take in order to start operating, and it is 
obtained from LaPorta et al. (2002). 
 
We have some variables reflecting the weight of some interest groups in the policies of 
interest, although this clearly is an area that can be expanded in future research. We 
have the number of telecommunications workers divided by the overall population in 
(staff) as a measure of the size of the incumbent, and the percentage of urban population 
(urbanpop) as a measure of the size of a social group demanding new services and 
hence a priori in favour of telecom liberalization8. 
 
We have three variables reflecting the general quality of government, obtained from 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). These are regqual, goveff and rulelaw, and they are 
composite indices measuring, respectively, the general quality of government, 
government effectiveness and the rule of law. 
 
                                                 
8 Both measures correspond to 1994. 
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And we have one additional variable, instconst, which is an index of institutional 
constraints on executive bodies, first used in Henisz and Zelner (2000). We use the 
average for this index between 1945 and 1975. This index gives a measure of the ability 
of governments to commit themselves or their successors to policies not to expropriate 
investments. 
 
Table 1 reports the correlation matrix of these institutional and political variables for 
our observations, plus our two indices of regulator independence, indep and indep(pc). 
The table clearly shows that these variables are measuring different phenomena, and 
that not taking some of them into account may lead us to omit some important 
influences in the analysis. The rule of law index, the government effectiveness index 
and the regulatory quality index are highly positively correlated. The legal origin and 
the number of procedures to set up a new business are highly negatively correlated. 
Surprisingly, our two indices of regulatory independence are not highly correlated with 
any of the other institutional indices. We tackle this issue more in depth below, when 
we discuss our preliminary results. 
 
 
Table 1. Correlation between sector-specific and general regulation variables 
 
 regqual indep indep(pc) goveff rulelaw legal instconst procedures
regqual 1        
indep 0.1078   1       
indep(pc) 0.0493   0.7080 1      
goveff 0.9221   0.1246 0.0093    1     
rulelaw 0.8743   -0.009 -0.087    0.9285   1    
legal 0.4439   -0.013 -0.275 0.4823 0.4963 1   
instconst 0.3558   -0.027 -0.161 0.4971 0.5447 0.6194 1  
procedures -0.639   -0.028 0.0845 -0.648 -0.664 -0.775 -0.6393 1 
 
 
We also have data on the GDP per capita in 1998 in dollar terms to control for the level 
of development in each country, which may also influence telecom performance. There 
is a high correlation between regulatory quality (and also government effectiveness and 
rule of law) and GDP per capita. The following graph points to a non-linear positive 
association between both: 
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4. Econometric results 
4.1. The determinants of endogenous policies 
 
Tables 2a-d show that legal origins and lagged performance are significant determinants 
of the entry index. Our estimations are consistent with the hypothesis that less 
interventionist societies tend to liberalize more, and impose a regulation which favours 
the incumbents to a lesser degree. Societies with better telecommunications sectors also 
tend to liberalize more. Interestingly, the principal components index of asymmetric 
deregulation, entry(pc), however, did not show any significant pattern. 
 
 
Table 2a. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable entry  
intercept -.6412943    -0.74    
legal  .4984411    2.97    
ideology -.1707091     -0.34    
urbanpop .015199    0.95    
subsworker (lagged) .0058445    1.39    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.3965  
 
Table 2b. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation  
 OLS 
estimates 
t-statistic 
Dependent Variable entry  
intercept -.0718073    -0.12    
legal  .5015454    3.04    
subsworker (lagged) .0085311     2.85    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.3793  
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Table 2c. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable entry  
intercept -.0558621    -0.09    
legal  .5419218    3.27    
linesworker (lagged) .0086778    2.61    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.3599  
 
Table 2d. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable entry  
intercept   
procedures -.1394231    -2.60    
linesworker (lagged) .0085237    2.24    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.3449  
 
Ideology, however, appears to have no impact on the decision to liberalize, as shown in 
Table 3. Telecommunications liberalization does not appear to be a partisan policy. This 
is not incompatible with some aspects of the reform process being partisan. For 
example, privatization of the incumbent could be a partisan policy, with right wing 
parties more inclined to privatize. But our composite indices do not single out  
individual policy dimensions, and hence we are not able to make any inference on them. 
 
 
Table 3. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable entry  
intercept -.0503046      -0.08    
legal .542201    3.22    
ideology -.0680929    -0.14    
linesworker (lagged) .0087813    2.54    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.3603  
 
 
 
As we saw in Table 1, our two indices of regulatory independence are not highly 
correlated with any of the other institutional indices, and in particular they are not 
correlated with overall regulatory quality. We interpret this as evidence that formal 
regulatory independence is compatible with different levels of general regulatory or 
institutional quality. However, this does not mean that regulatory independence does not 
show any systematic pattern. Our regression results on the determinants of 
independence (see tables 4a-b) show that independence is a substitute for other ways to 
achieve commitment not to expropriate. In particular, the index of constraints on the 
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executive appears to be negatively and significantly related to the creation of truly 
independent regulatory agencies. The sign of the ideological dummy and of the rule of 
law variable are also negative although not significant. This is consistent with the Levy 
and Spiller (1996) view of regulatory commitment and credibility. Countries achieve 
regulatory commitment not to expropriate investment, yielding good results in terms of 
industry performance, if they are able to create credible institutions that are well adapted 
to the institutional endowment of each country. Since institutional endowments vary 
across countries, the way different countries set up commitment institutions will vary. 
Take the cases of the UK and Chile, two countries that were among the first to 
successfully privatize their telecommunications incumbents and introduce competition. 
The UK, with its centralized system and majoritarian government has very few 
constraints on the executive’s behaviour, so that new and special institutions, such as an 
independent regulator, must be put in place to achieve commitment. 
 
Table 4a. Equation (ii) Regulatory independence 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable indep(pc)  
Intercept .5915471    1.11    
ideology -.3931289    -1.18    
staff 6.003888    2.65    
rulelaw -.4127745    -1.52    
instconst -.233859    -2.00    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.2547  
 
Table 4b. Equation (ii) Regulatory independence 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable indep  
Intercept 5.895357    4.52    
ideology -1.139659     -1.40    
staff 15.28706    2.75    
rulelaw -1.0595    -1.59    
instconst -.3805054     -1.33    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.2545  
 
In addition to this, the way the independent regulator is set up takes advantage of other 
features of the British institutional endowment, such as the respect for contracts and the 
independence of the judiciary. In Chile, however, with a presidential system and 
coalition governments, it is very difficult to change legislation, so that commitment is 
achieved through very detailed legislation, which, as thought at the time of reform, 
would make setting up a regulatory agency redundant and hence not cost effective if 
there is any cost to independence (for example in terms of political legitimacy or other 
costs to the political principals). Hence Chile is one of the few countries in our data set 
that does not even have a separate telecom regulator. 
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Quite robustly in our regressions, the effect of the size of the incumbent (as measured 
by the number of telecommunications staff some years before the reform) has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the decision to create a truly independent 
regulatory agency. This is a surprising result, and we interpret it as the incumbent 
preferring an independent regulator in the face of the coming liberalization, which will 
inevitably be associated with more interest group competition. This is consistent with 
the view of Henisz and Zelner (2000) on the electricity industry, where they show that 
incumbents lobby for the creation of constraints on investment expropriation if they 
foresee strong interest group competition. 
 
To sum up, the data do not reject the part of hypothesis 1 that predicts that market 
opening policies are related to the non-interventionist tradition of countries, nor the part 
of hypothesis 2 that predicts that regulator independence is determined by the 
institutional endowment of countries. We also find support for the part of hypothesis 2 
that predicted that independence is associated to interest group pressure. In this case, we 
find that countries with a larger incumbent are more prone to create truly independent 
agencies. We conjecture that large incumbents may find that independent specialized 
regulators (with staff members probably recruited among previous incumbent staff) may 
be more easily captured than governments, and/or that large incumbents may have more 
to lose without an independent regulator, if the independent regulator, as a credible 
commitment device, contributes to alleviate the under-investment problem. This is so 
because larger incumbents have larger sunk investments in infrastructures. 
 
4.2 The effects of policies 
 
We first investigate the determinants of telecommunications network penetration (lines 
per 100 inhabitants and growth in lines per 100 inhabitants). These are the endogenous 
variables usually focused on in the studies that work with the ITU data set.  
 
The following graph suggests the existence of a positive association between entry 
policies and telecom penetration: 
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In the regressions results, although the entry index is not significantly related to growth 
in network penetration, it is significantly related to network penetration in 2001 (see 
tables 5a-b) if liberalization is taken as exogenous. This significant relationship 
disappears once the endogeneity of liberalization is taken into account.  
 
 
Table 5a. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
intercept 6.223462    2.37 
gdpcap   .001765    15.33    
entry 2.173517    2.47    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.9012  
 
 
Table 5b. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 IV estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
intercept 6.813583    1.63    
gdpcap   .001781    11.92    
entry 1.824838    0.84    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.9002  
Instrumented: entry / Instrument: legal 
 
 
The entry variable shows the same pattern in determining the telecom network 
penetration, as reported in Tables 6a-b, if we control for the effect of institutional 
variables such as regulatory quality. Hence OLS over-estimates the contribution of the 
entry variable. 
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Table 6a. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
Intercept 5.893217     2.26    
gdpcap   .0016269    10.86    
entry 1.725991    1.87    
regqual 4.910904    1.41    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.9068  
 
Table 6b. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 IV estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
Intercept 6.993702    1.65    
gdpcap   .0016312    10.69    
regqual 5.925041    1.26    
entry .9316063    0.36    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.9042  
Instrumented: entry 
Instruments: legal 
 
The independence of the regulator does not appear to be a significant determinant of 
network penetration with OLS, but it becomes significant at the 10% level when we 
take into account the endogeneity of independence through Instrumental Variable 
estimation, as shown in Tables 7a-d. 
 
 
 
Table 7a. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
intercept 8.285623    2.13    
gdpcap   .0018636    16.00    
indep  .2909294    0.49    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.8843  
Table 7b. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
intercept 9.937633    4.16    
gdpcap  .0018595    15.93    
indep(pc) .8972316    0.541      
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.8848  
 
Table 7c. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 IV estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
intercept -15.82578    -0.99    
gdpcap   .0017327    7.06    
indep 5.169759     1.67    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.6096  
 
Table 7d. Equation (i) Network penetration 
 IV estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesinhab  
intercept 10.61103     3.17    
gdpcap   .0018608    11.01    
indep(pc) 8.359294    1.72    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.7820  
Instrumented: indep          Instrumented: indep(pc)   
Instruments: staff, instconst           Instruments: staff, instconst 
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Next, we look at the determinants of productivity in the telecommunications sector, as 
measured by subscribers per employee and lines per employee. The principal 
components index of asymmetric deregulation has a negative impact on productivity 
(measured as subscribers per employee) in levels, although the significance of this 
estimate declines as we add variables. The same happens when productivity is measured 
as lines per employee, although the regression results are not reported here.  
 
Table 8. Equation (i) Productivity 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable subsworker  
intercept 311.5764    4.72    
gdpcap .0014085    0.33    
entry(pc) -80.46346    -2.05    
regqual 133.5519     1.39    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.1862  
 
 
 We checked for the effect of the ad hoc entry index on productivity, first with OLS and 
next with IV estimation using the legal index as instrumental variable, without any 
significant results. 
 
Finally, we see in Tables 9a-c that regulatory independence has a negative or non 
significant (when appropriately instrumented) effect on productivity. 
  
To sum up this part of the empirical analysis, we find weak support for the part of 
hypothesis 3 that predicts that independence contributes to alleviate the under-
investment problem. 
 
 
Table 9a. Equation (i) Productivity 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesworker  
intercept 218.8331    4.69    
gdpcap .0026235    1.85    
indep -13.5829    -2.00    
entry 7.860585    0.72    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.2087  
Table 9b. Equation (i) Productivity 
 OLS estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable subsworker  
intercept 472.6807    4.28    
gdpcap .0050013    1.49    
indep -24.21684    -1.51    
entry 4.929714    0.19    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared 0.1238  
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Table 9a. Equation (i) Productivity 
 IV estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable linesworker  
intercept 342.9504    2.23    
gdpcap .005167    2.19    
indep -21.675    -0.75    
entry -42.40925    -1.25 
# Observations 37  
R-Squared   
Instrumented: entry, indep 
Table 9b. Equation (i) Productivity 
 IV estimates t-statistic 
Dependent Variable subsworker  
intercept 774.7448     2.25    
gdpcap .010074    1.90    
indep -52.31917    -0.80    
entry -90.9437    -1.19    
# Observations 37  
R-Squared   
Instrumented: entry, indep 
Instruments: legal, staff             Instruments: legal, staff 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
In this paper, we presented new data, in the form of four indices, on entry policies and 
the independence of regulators for a cross section of countries. These indices take into 
account the multi-dimensionality of policies and institutions. In the case of 
independence, this moves the empirical literature on regulation one step closer to the 
empirical literature on Central Bank independence in monetary policy, where the use of 
independence indices as opposed to dummy variables has become common practice. 
  
These indices were combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional 
and political data to quantify both the determinants and the impact of 
telecommunications policies. We found that liberalization policies which favour 
entrants are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an 
interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per 
se. We also found that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the 
behaviour of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more 
prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. The effect of the institutional 
endowment is consistent with the previous literature on regulatory institutions. The 
positive association between incumbent size and independent regulators has not been 
observed before and may seem puzzling. We conjecture that large incumbents may find 
that independent specialized regulators (with staff members probably recruited among 
previous incumbent staff) may be more easily captured than governments, and/or that 
large incumbents may have more to lose without an independent regulator, if the 
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independent regulator (as a commitment device) contributes to alleviate the under-
investment problem. This is so because larger incumbents have larger sunk investments 
in infrastructures. 
 
We found weak evidence that the creation of truly independent regulatory agencies has 
a positive effect on network penetration when we take into account the endogeneity of 
independence. There is no evidence, with this preliminary data set, of a significant 
effect (positive or negative) of market opening policies on any of the performance 
variables used in this study. However, a positive significant effect on network 
penetration would be predicted with the same data set if the endogeneity of market 
opening policies was not taken into account. This illustrates (along the lines of Röller 
and Duso, 2002, and Besley and Case, 2000) that very different results may be 
(incorrectly) obtained if the endogeneity of policies is not taken into account.  
 
Despite the importance of creating politically sustainable regulatory systems, the 
establishment of separate regulatory agencies in telecommunications is a very recent 
phenomenon.  
 
Equivalently, it is probably too early to reach any final conclusion on the effects of 
different market opening policies. Our results on the determinants of policies and 
institutions, however, point at some systematic relationships that fit well with some of 
the theoretical literature on institutions. Further research may also explore in a more 
systematic way the interaction between market opening policies and institutional design. 
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Appendix 1: 
Original policy variables. Definition and measurement9 
 
Investment conditions imposed on entrants: equals 0 if the entry to the industry is 
subjected to investment conditions of any kind and 1 otherwise. If there are no entrants, 
the value is set to 0. 
Average Number of Mobile Providers: average of the number of providers that were in 
operation in 1996 and 1997. 
Number Portability. Fixed Telephony: equals 0 if number portability in fixed telephony 
is not possible and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier Selection. Local: equals 0 if carrier selection of the local operator is not possible 
and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier Selection. Long Distance and International: equals 0 if the carrier selection of 
the long distance operator (national & international) is not possible and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier pre-selection. Local: equals 0 if carrier pre-selection of the local operator is not 
possible and 1 otherwise. 
Carrier pre-selection. Long distance and international: equals 0 if carrier pre-selection of 
the long distance operator (national & international) is not possible and 1 otherwise. 
Year of establishment of effective operation: equals 0 if the regulatory authority is a 
department of the government and grows from to as the year of establishment is back in 
time. 
Private Ownership of the incumbent (%): percentage of the incumbent that is not owned 
directly by the government. 
Local Loop Unbundling Availability: equals 0 if local loop unbundling is not available 
and 1 otherwise. 
Wireless Local Access licensing: equals 0 if there are no licences for Wireless Local 
Access and 1 otherwise. 
Cable restrictions imposed on incumbents: equals 0 if incumbents have no restrictions 
to cable ownership and 1 otherwise. 
Method of Spectrum Allocation: equals 0 if the mobile industry is under monopoly, 1 if 
the licensing process is on a “first come first served” basis, 2 if the spectrum allocation 
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise stated, the measurement refers to the situation at the beginning of 1998. The original 
data on which the indices are based is available upon request.  
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is done through comparative tenders, 3 if it is done through competitive tenders with a 
financial offer, and 4 if it is done through auctions. 
Licensing: equals 1 if the regulator has the power to grant licences and 0 if it is a 
function carried out only by a ministry. In case the ministry is the only regulator, this 
variable is set to 0 as well. 
Interconnection: equals 1 if the regulator has the power to establish and administrate 
interconnection regimes and 0 in the same situations as in the previous variable. 
Tariffs: equals 1 if the regulator can determine regulated tariffs and 0 in the same 
situations as the previous variable. 
Scarce Resources: equals 1 if the regulator can administrate scarce resources, such as 
spectrum frequencies and numeration plans, and 0 in the same situations as before. 
Universal Service: equals 1 if the regulator can establish and administrate a universal 
service and 0 in the same situations as before. 
Funding: equals 0 if the regulator gets its funds from the government budget, 1 if it also 
gets fees from the operators and 2 if the funding is only through fees paid by the 
operators. 
Appointed by: equals 0 if the head of the regulatory authority is appointed directly by 
the government, 1 if he/she is appointed by the government and the legislature and 2 if 
he/she is appointed only by the legislature. In case the regulatory authority is a 
department of the government, it takes the value of 0. 
Length of term: years of the term in office for the regulator. If the regulatory authority is 
a department of the government or its term is not defined, the value is set to 0. 
Reporting to: equals 0 if the regulatory authority has to report to the government, 1 if it 
has to report to the government and to the legislature, 2 if it has to report only to the 
legislature and 3 if it reports to no one. 
 
Appendix 2: Indices Construction 
A2.1. Entry and indep 
 
The indices entry and indep use each of them a number of original variables in the 
following way. First, the original variables are re-coded, so that each of the observations 
can be measured on a 0-1 range. This is done by dividing the original metric for each 
observation by the maximum value of the variable (for example, if Spain has a value of 
2 in “method of spectrum allocation” the re-coded value will be 2/4=0.5, where 4 is the 
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maximum value that takes this original variable). Then the values of all the re-coded 
original variables used for the index are added for each country. Hence the final index 
will have a maximum value equal to the number of original variables used in its 
computation. 
Entry uses as original variables: investment conditions imposed to entrants, average 
number of mobile providers, Method of spectrum allocation, number portability (fixed 
telephony), number portability (mobile telephony), carrier selection (local), carrier 
selection (long distance and international), carrier pre-selection (local), carrier pre-
selection (long distance and international). 
Indep uses as original variables licensing (exc. Mobile), Interconnection, Tariffs, Scarce 
Resources, Universal Service, Funding, Appointed by, Term, Reporting to, Year of 
establishment of effective operation, Private ownership of incumbent. 
 
 
Indep(pc) and entry(pc) 
These indices are computed using the principal components methodology. The original 
variables for each index are used to find the linear combinations of that minimize the 
overall variance. 
 
Indep(pc) uses as original variables Licensing, Interconnection, Tariffs, Scarce 
Resources, Universal Service, Funding, Appointed by, Length of term, Reporting to. 
Out of the three principal components selected, we selected number 1 for ease of 
interpretation. 
 
Entry(pc) uses as original variables Investment conditions imposed to entrants, Average 
number of mobile providers, Number portability (fixed telephony), Carrier selection 
(local), Carrier selection (long distance & international), Carrier pre-selection (local), 
Carrier pre-selection (long distance & international), Year of establishment of effective 
operation,10 Public ownership of the incumbent, local loop unbundling availability, 
                                                 
10 “Year of establishment of effective operation” is used here for the principal components entry index, 
suggesting that perhaps it may indicate the year in which the liberalization process starts. Both this 
original variable and “Public ownership of the incumbent” may be related both to independence and to 
entry, which is why we have them in the entry(pc) index and in the indep index. Their loading in the final 
entry(pc) index chosen, however, is either negative or negligible. 
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Wireless local access licensing, Cable restrictions imposed on incumbents. Out of four 
principal components obtained, we selected number 2 for ease of interpretation. 
 
Principal components indices are obtained in both cases as follows. We describe the 
total variance of a set of n points (the original variables) in p dimensional space by 
introducing a new set of p orthogonal and uncorrelated variates (the new indices). The 
new set is formed by taking normalized linear combinations of the original set so that 
the rth variate generated has the rth largest variance. 
The following tables show the numerical results for the computation of Principal 
Components, first for the set of “independence” variables, and second for the set of 
“asymmetric deregulation” variables. The figures in the interior cells are the loadings of 
each original variable in each of the new components. 
 
Table A2 I 
Component  
1 2 3 
Licensing .227 .656 .481 
Interconnection .842 .232 .202 
Tariffs .741 .414  
Scarce resources   .915 
Universal Service .351 .181 .705 
Funding .732 -.257 .266 
Appointed by .128 .744  
Length of term .643 .142 .139 
Reporting to  .684  
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Table A2 II 
Component  
 1 2 3 4 
Investment conditions 
imposed on entrants 
-.202 -.504 .154 -.686 
Average number of 
mobile providers 
.330 .220 .704 .131 
Number portability 
(fixed telephony) 
-.315 .824  .115 
Carrier selection (local) .765  .192 .165 
Carrier selection (long 
distance & 
international) 
.135 .196 .743 .390 
Carrier pre-selection 
(local) 
.906 .262 .136  
Carrier pre-selection 
(long distance & 
international) 
.373 .709 .203  
Year of establishment of 
effective operation 
-.793 -.225 -.347  
Public ownership of the 
incumbent 
-.166  -.859  
Local loop unbundling 
availability 
.441 .715  .143 
Wireless local access 
licensing 
.270 .562 .349 -.352 
Cable restrictions 
imposed on incumbents 
  .388 .804 
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Appendix 3: Values for the indices on liberalization and regulator independence 
  indep indep(pc) entry entry(pc)
Germany 7,67095 0,19029 5,09184 3,03192
Chile 1 -2,01649 4,059 0,15638
France 4,20381 -0,66522 2,07237 -0,48506
USA 9,38095 0,0352 6,94278 0,853
Spain 5,84762 0,59838 2,13408 -0,59481
Italy 5,85 0,3653 1,89987 -0,92657
Japan 0,35 -2,01649 3,79233 -0,42421
N. Zealand 1 -2,01649 4,64653 -0,98545
UK 6,51429 1,311 4,31309 1,56787
Sweden 6,25714 0,93042 3,08131 -0,41989
Perú 4,40476 0,70353 1,60863 -0,67873
Argentina 4,24762 -0,7008 1,84994 -0,59886
Canada 9,31429 0,72516 6,04781 1,30539
Mexico 3,75143 0,27196 3,37677 0,74609
Venezuela 7,5381 0,19817 1,02202 -0,45261
Brazil 7,84762 0,62186 1,76561 -0,03961
India 0,5619 -1,5399 1,33618 0,19229
Philippines 7,4381 -0,2334 2,5 -0,05405
Singapore 7,08143 0,62973 3,08843 -0,15796
Israel 0,46 -2,01649 1,50674 0,09664
Jordan 7,8381 0,27204 0,97128 -0,48573
Morocco 3,78095 0,24166 0,19388 -0,32733
Ethiopia 5,57088 -0,59084 0,18127 -0,24681
Madagascar 6,62776 0,62199 0,97473 -0,45348
South Africa 7,31429 -0,39637 0,85994 -0,44678
Bulgaria 5,06667 1,62873 1,33426 -0,24087
Finland 4,4501 0,23449 4,14624 3,63491
Denmark 8,0381 0,71002 2,97274 -1,1273
Norway 6,30476 0,81038 2,96901 -0,96191
Portugal 7,77857 0,47087 0,94137 -0,54706
Switzerland 5,47143 -0,52012 1,23732 -0,05314
Australia 4,17762 -1,72753 3,47705 0,46473
Austria 5,51429 0,87485 2,33373 -0,03961
Belgium 5,68048 0,41756 1,23472 -0,49076
Ireland 7,33333 -0,37116 1,08901 -0,42951
Luxembourg 3,5619 0,97623 0,32099 -0,48045
Netherlands 6,26676 0,9715 2,30331 0,09933
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